Why are people interested in money? Specifically, what could be the biological basis for the extraordinary incentive and reinforcing power of money, which seems to be unique to the human species? We identify two ways in which a commodity which is of no biological significance in itself can become a strong motivator. The first is if it is used as a tool, and by a metaphorical extension this is often applied to money: it is used instrumentally, in order to obtain (...) biologically relevant incentives. Second, substances can be strong motivators because they imitate the action of natural incentives but do not produce the fitness gains for which those incentives are instinctively sought. The classic examples of this process are psychoactive drugs, but we argue that the drug concept can also be extended metaphorically to provide an account of money motivation. From a review of theoretical and empirical literature about money, we conclude that (i) there are a number of phenomena that cannot be accounted for by a pure Tool Theory of money motivation; (ii) supplementing Tool Theory with a Drug Theory enables the anomalous phenomena to be explained; and (iii) the human instincts that, according to a Drug Theory, money parasitizes include trading (derived from reciprocal altruism) and object play. (Published Online April 5 2006) Key Words: economic behaviour; evolutionary psychology; giving; incentive; money; motivation; play; reciprocal altruism. (shrink)

Current theory-of-mind research faces the challenge of reconciling two sets of seemingly incompatible findings: Whereas children come to solve explicit verbal false belief tasks from around 4years of age, recent studies with various less explicit measures such as looking time, anticipatory looking, and spontaneous behavior suggest that even infants can succeed on some FB tasks. In response to this tension, two-systems theories propose to distinguish between an early-developing system, tracking simple forms of mental states, and a later-developing system, based on (...) fully developed concepts of belief and other propositional attitudes. One prediction of such theories is that the early-developing system has signature limits concerning aspectuality. We tested this prediction in two experiments. The first experiment showed that 2- and 3-year-olds take into account a protagonist's true or false belief about the location of an object in their active helping behavior. In contrast, toddlers' helping behavior did not differentiate between true and false belief conditions when the protagonist's belief essentially involved aspectuality. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with a more stringent method designed to rule out more parsimonious explanations. Taken together, the current findings are compatible with the possibility that early theory-of-mind reasoning is subject to signature limits as predicted by the two-systems account. (shrink)

Our response amplifies our case that money is best seen as both a drug and a tool. Some commentators challenge our core assumptions: In this response we, therefore, explain in more detail why we assume that money is an exceptionally strong motivator, and that a biological explanation of money motivation is required. We also provide evidence to support those assumptions. Other commentators criticise our use of the drug metaphor, particularly arguing that it is empirically empty; and in our response we (...) seek to show how it can be submitted to test – aided by some commentaries which suggest such tests. In addition, we explain, with evidence, why we do not think that the notion of money as a generalised conditioned reinforcer provides a satisfactory alternative to the tool/drug account. The largest group of commentaries suggests alternative instincts on which the drug-like effects of money might be based, other than the reciprocation and play instincts we propose; in our response, we explain why we still prefer our original proposals, but we accept that alternative or additional instincts may indeed underlie money motivation. A final group of commentaries carries the argument further, suggesting extensions to the tool/drug model, in ways with which we are broadly in sympathy. The purpose of the tool and drug metaphors is to encourage reflection on the biological origins of money motivation, and to that extent at least we believe that they have succeeded. (Published Online April 5 2006). (shrink)

Everyday financial behaviour involves inter-temporal choices, between saving, spending, and debt. Consumers do not always take these decisions to their best advantage. Ainslie's analysis of the means to willpower as suppression, resolve, and habit is potentially applicable to understanding and improving the decisions that consumers make. Some relevant research on these topics exists, and it is briefly reviewed here.

(2001). Two unconventional approaches to the future of economics: Ecological economics and economic psychology. World Futures: Vol. 56, Values, Ethics and Econmics, Part II, pp. 351-367.

Women's preference for symmetrical men need not have evolved as part of a good gene sexual selection (GGSS) reproductive strategy employed during recent human evolutionary history. It may be a remnant of the reproductive strategy of a perhaps promiscuous species which existed prior to the divergence of the human line from that of the bonobo and chimp.

Human adults appear different from other animals in their ability to form abstract mental representations that go beyond perceptual similarity. In short, they can conceptualize the world. This book brings together leading psychologists and neuroscientists to tackle the age-old puzzle of what might be unique about human concepts.

From childhood through to adulthood, retirement and finally death, _The Economic Psychology of Everyday Life_ uniquely explores the economic problems all individuals have to solve across the course of their lives. Webley, Burgoyne, Lea and Young begin by introducing the concept of economic behaviour and its study. They then examine the main economic issues faced at each life stage, including: * the impact of advertising on children * buying a first house and setting up home * changing family roles and (...) gender-linked inequality * redundancy and unemployment * coping on a pension * obituaries, wills and inheritance. Finally they draw together the commonalties of economic problems across the lifespan, discuss generational and cultural changes in economic behaviour, and examine the significance of other, non-economic constraints, upon individuals. _The Economic Psychology of Everyday Life_ provides a much-needed comprehensive and accessible guide to economic psychology which will be of great interest to researchers and students. (shrink)

'... this book to open up exciting new dimensions in the study of human evolution' Robin Dunbar School of Biological Sciences, Liverpool 'The book is billed as being of interest to a multi-disciplinary audience and meets its aim of befitting advanced students and researchers in evolutionary psychology, anthropology, evolution and palaeontology' QJEP Section BTo most people it seems obvious that there are major mental differences between ourselves and other species, but there is considerable debate over exactly how special our minds (...) are, in what respects, and which were the critical evolutionary events that have shaped us. Some researchers claim language as a solely human, even defining, attribute, while others claim that only humans are truly conscious. These questions have been explored mainly by archaeologists and anthropologists until recently, but this volume aims to show what psychologists have to say on the evolution of mind. The book begins with a thorough overview of what is known of the non-primate mind and its evolution. Following this, an international range of experts discuss in temporal sequence the human mind at various stages of evolution, beginning with the pre-hominids of 20 million years ago and ending with contemporary human behaviour. Accessible to students and researchers alike in psychology, anthropology, evolution, archaeology, and ethology, The Descent of Mind provides a range of provocative answers to the timeless question of what it means to be human. (shrink)

'... this book to open up exciting new dimensions in the study of human evolution' Robin Dunbar School of Biological Sciences, Liverpool 'The book is billed as being of interest to a multi-disciplinary audience and meets its aim of befitting advanced students and researchers in evolutionary psychology, anthropology, evolution and palaeontology' QJEP Section BTo most people it seems obvious that there are major mental differences between ourselves and other species, but there is considerable debate over exactly how special our minds (...) are, in what respects, and which were the critical evolutionary events that have shaped us. Some researchers claim language as a solely human, even defining, attribute, while others claim that only humans are truly conscious. These questions have been explored mainly by archaeologists and anthropologists until recently, but this volume aims to show what psychologists have to say on the evolution of mind. The book begins with a thorough overview of what is known of the non-primate mind and its evolution. Following this, an international range of experts discuss in temporal sequence the human mind at various stages of evolution, beginning with the pre-hominids of 20 million years ago and ending with contemporary human behaviour. Accessible to students and researchers alike in psychology, anthropology, evolution, archaeology, and ethology, The Descent of Mind provides a range of provocative answers to the timeless question of what it means to be human. (shrink)

The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...) one methodological and one structural. On the other hand, Goldman raises an important question when he is asking how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Reasons why Goldman's attempt to understand common sense mental representations by using an analogy from visual perception is problematic are discussed. The role which is attributed to a phenomenology is evaluated. (shrink)

Abstract. This brief article introduces a symposium series on science and spirituality. Articles by Paul Voelker, Andrea Hollingsworth, Jason P. Roberts, Stephen McMillin, and Steven Cottam represent the prize-winning papers from the first two symposia.

This paper considers the problems that arise when death, which is a philosophically difficult concept, is incorporated into healthcare metrics, such as the quality-adjusted life year (QALY). These problems relate closely to the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide because negative QALY scores can be taken to mean that patients would be ‘better off dead’. There is confusion in the literature about the meaning of 0 QALY, which is supposed to act as an ‘anchor’ for the surveyed preferences on which (...) QALYs are based. In the context of the debate over euthanasia, the QALY assumes an ability to make meaningful comparisons between life-states and death. Not only is this assumption questionable, but the ethical debate is much more broad than the question of whether death is preferable to a state of living. QALYs are derived from preferences about health states, so do not necessarily reflect preferences about events (eg, dying) or actions (eg, killing). This paper presents a new kind of problem for the QALY. As it stands, the QALY provides confused and unreliable information when it reports zero or negative values, and faces further problems when it appears to recommend death. This should preclude its use in the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide. These problems only apply where the QALY involves or seems to involve a comparison between life-states and death, and are not relevant to the more general discussion of the use of QALYs as a tool for comparing the benefits derived from treatment options. (shrink)

This study appeared in full in the last issue of Research Ethics Review : 22). JM's research focuses on chronic pain and the evidence to support the effectiveness of current interventions. His current proposal has two dimensions in which mixed quantitative and qualitative methods will be used. One examines professionals' beliefs and the evidence on which they draw to support these. The other focusses on patients' experiences of the interventions and their views about what is most helpful in achieving pain (...) relief. JM is an experienced researcher. He has used a similar design in previous work. Before submitting his application he consulted with the key professionals and patient representatives in the pain team and elsewhere. Everyone has supported the study and senior colleagues are of the opinion that it is well designed and appropriate. JM attended the REC meeting and found it an uncomfortable experience. No one was introduced. Questioning was hostile and some of the questions raised seemed to suggest that the application had not been read very carefully, if at all. He has now received a letter stating that a favourable opinion cannot be issued. A completely different methodology is put forward as essential. The REC advises that ‘the study would be more successful if it were conducted in a different type of setting, eg out-patients, and based on a questionnaire alone’. JM is very angry about this. (shrink)

Heal (1996a) maintains that evidence of cognitive penetrability doesn't determine whether stimulation theory or theory theory wins. Given the wide variety of mechanisms and processes that get called ‘simulation’, we argue that it's not useful to ask‘who wins?’. The label ‘simulation’picks out no natural or theoretically interesting category. We propose a more fine‐grained taxonomy and argue that some processes that have been labelled ‘simulation’, eg.,‘actual‐situation‐simulation’, clearly do exist, while other processes labelled ‘simulation’, e.g., ‘pretence‐driven‐off‐line‐simulation’are quite controversial. We do concede that (...) evidence of cognitive penetrability isn't decisive evidence against pretence‐driven‐off‐line‐simulation. Nonetheless, advocates of pretence‐driven‐off‐line‐simulation need to provide some explanation of the experimental evidence of penetrability. We argue that Heal's suggestion that simulation is restricted to‘rational’processes is unprincipled, and we offer an alternative proposal for restricted simulation. (shrink)

Decisions on which new health technologies to provide are controversial because of the scarcity of healthcare resources, the competing demands of payers, providers and patients and the uncertainty of the evidence base. Given this, additional information about new health technologies is often considered valuable. One response is to make access to a new health technology conditional on further research. Access can be restricted to patients who participate in a research study, such as a randomised controlled trial; alternatively, a new treatment (...) can be made generally available, but only on condition that further evidence is collected (eg, on long-term outcomes and adverse events, in patient registries). The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which provides guidance on which new health technologies to make available under the UK's NHS, for example, has made some research conditional recommendations, and the current interest in such options suggests that they are likely to become more prevalent in the future. This paper identifies and discusses the main ethical issues created by this distinctive range of recommendations. We argue that decisions to put research conditions on access to new technologies are compatible with widely accepted values, principles and practices relevant to resource allocation. However, there are important features of these distinctive judgements that must be taken into account by resource allocation decision-making bodies and research ethics committees, and that require new sorts of empirical data. (shrink)

Arthur C. Danto ha insegnato che l’identità e il contenuto di un’opera d’arte dipendono da «l’atmosfera di una teoria che l’occhio non può percepire». Per “teoria” egli non intende le idee elaborate dai filosofi dell’arte. La sua tesi consiste nell’affermazione che un’opera d’arte può essere riconosciuta e apprezzata adeguatamente solo quando venga vista in relazione con la tradizione delle opere, gli scritti, le pratiche, i generi e le convenzioni che formano lo sfondo dal quale emerge come...

We introduce the notion of -determinacy for Γ a pointclass and E an equivalence relation on a Polish space X. A case of particular interest is the case when E = EG is the shift-action o...

Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness-features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. But it has played no real role in philosophical semantics. This is surprising; sentences have aboutness-properties if anything does. Aboutness is the first book to examine through (...) a philosophical lens the role of subject matter in meaning. A long-standing tradition sees meaning as truth-conditions, to be specified by listing the scenarios in which a sentence is true. Nothing is said about the principle of selection--about what in a scenario gets it onto the list. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned. Stephen Yablo maintains that this is not just a feature of subject matter, but its essence. One indicates what a sentence is about by mapping out logical space according to its changing ways of being true or false. The notion of content that results--directed content--is brought to bear on a range of philosophical topics, including ontology, verisimilitude, knowledge, loose talk, assertive content, and philosophical methodology. Written by one of today's leading philosophers, Aboutness represents a major advance in semantics and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Doing epistemology -- Kinds of knowledge? -- A first theory of knowledge -- Refining our theory of knowledge -- Is it even possible to have knowledge? -- Applying epistemology.

In Return to Reason, Stephen Toulmin argues that the potential for reason to improve our lives has been hampered by a serious imbalance in our pursuit of ...

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox is a controversial discourse, rich with facts and observations gathered by one of the most erudite minds of our ...

[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces (...) of nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. /// [Andre Gallois] I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second. (shrink)

Stephen Toulmin argues that the potential for reason to improve our lives has been hampered by a serious imbalance in our pursuit of knowledge. The centuries-old dominance of rationality has diminished the value of reasonableness. Toulmin issues a powerful call to redress the balance between rationality and reasonableness.

"Biophilia" is the term coined by Edward O. Wilson to describe what he believes is humanity's innate affinity for the natural world. In his landmark book Biophilia, he examined how our tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes might be a biologically based need, integral to our development as individuals and as a species. That idea has caught the imagination of diverse thinkers. The Biophilia Hypothesis brings together the views of some of the most creative scientists of our time, (...) each attempting to amplify and refine the concept of biophilia. The variety of perspectives -- psychological, biological, cultural, symbolic, and aesthetic -- frame the theoretical issues by presenting empirical evidence that supports or refutes the hypothesis. Numerous examples illustrate the idea that biophilia and its converse, biophobia, have a genetic component: fear, and even full-blown phobias of snakes and spiders are quick to develop with very little negative reinforcement, while more threatening modern artifacts -- knives, guns, automobiles -- rarely elicit such a response people find trees that are climbable and have a broad, umbrella-like canopy more attractive than trees without these characteristics people would rather look at water, green vegetation, or flowers than built structures of glass and concrete The biophilia hypothesis, if substantiated, provides a powerful argument for the conservation of biological diversity. More important, it implies serious consequences for our well-being as society becomes further estranged from the natural world. Relentless environmental destruction could have a significant impact on our quality of life, not just materially but psychologically and even spiritually. (shrink)

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivaks seminal contribution to contemporary thought defies disciplinary boundaries. From her early translations of Derrida to her subsequent engagement with Marxism, feminism and postcolonial studies and her recent work on human rights, the war on terror and globalization, she has proved to be one of the most vital of present-day thinkers. In this book Stephen Morton offers a wide-ranging introduction to and critique of Spivaks work. He examines her engagements with philosophers and other thinkers from Kant to (...) Paul de Man, feminists from Cixous to Helie-Lucas and literary texts by Charlotte Bronte, J. M. Coetzee, Mahasweta Devi and Jean Rhys. Spivaks thought is also situated in relation to subaltern studies. Throughout the book, Morton interrogates the materialist basis of Spivaks thought and demonstrates the ethical and political commitment which lies at the heart of her work. Stephen Morton provides an ideal introduction to the work of this complex and increasingly important thinker. (shrink)

A scholarly synthesis of biblical studies and Christian social ethics, designed to provide a biblical argument for intentional institutional change on behalf of social justice.

High levels of threat and uncertainty characterize the onset of societal crises. Here, people are exposed to conflicting information in the media, including disinformation. Because individuals often base their news selection on pre-existing attitudes, the present study aims to examine selective exposure effects in the face of a crisis, and identify right-wing ideological, trust-, and science-related beliefs that might influence the selection and sharing of disinformation. A representative survey of German internet users (N = 1101) at the time of the (...) COVID-19 pandemic outbreak showed a confirmation bias in crisis-related news selection and sharing. It revealed right-wing authoritarianism and political mistrust as significant predictors of disinformation selection. The influence of social dominance orientation, mistrust in politics, and perceived certainty of knowledge were significant for sharing disinformation. The present results extend previous knowledge about people’s (dis)information behavior in times of crisis, and shed light on groups particularly vulnerable to disinformation. (shrink)

In punishment, proportionality is the systematic mathematical relationship between the significance of the wrongdoing and the amount of punishment that may be imposed on the wrongdoer. In this chapter, Kershnar argues that there is no adequate equation for proportionality. The lack of an adequate equation rests on intuitions and the absence of a shared metric. If there is no equation for proportionality, then there is no proportionality. This is because if there is no equation for proportionality, then there is no (...) general justification for proportionality. Purported justifications of punishment that lack proportionality—specifically, consequentialism and consent theory—are implausible. The lack of proportionality, then, is a threat to the notion that some punishment is justified and, more generally, non-consequentialism. (shrink)

Abstract: Does the evolving influence of humanity on the Earth’s environment call for new virtues? How might such virtues be seen as contributing to human flourishing? In this paper, I develop Aristotle’s discussion of magnificence and magnanimity to provide a framework within which to discuss such claims. I also defend the controversial view that even if genuinely new virtues may be involved, these may be virtues to which we should not aspire (now, or perhaps ever).

This chapter addresses the potential contributions of neuroscience to criminal justice decision-making and policy, with special emphasis on criminal responsibility. The central question is whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal justice. The general conclusion is that it is scarcely useful at present but may become more relevant as the science progresses. After explaining the meaning of criminal responsibility in use, the chapter speculates about the source of claims for the positive influence of neuroscience. The scientific status of behavioral neuroscience and (...) two radical challenges to responsibility neuroscience allegedly raises, determinism and the death of agency, are discussed next. Then, the specific relevance of neuroscience to criminal law and the use of neuroscience in criminal cases in the United States and abroad are addressed. The penultimate section points to some areas warranting modest optimism for the use of neuroscience in criminal justice. A brief conclusion follows. (shrink)

A surprising feature of the White Rose anti-Nazi resistance pamphlets is their appeal to a foundational classical Chinese text, the Laozi (otherwise known as the Daodejing), to buttress their critique of fascism and authoritarianism. I argue that from the perspective of a 1942 educated readership, the act of quoting the Laozi functioned as a subtle and pointed nod to anti-fascist intellectuals in pre-war Germany, many of whom had interpreted the Laozi as an anti-authoritarian and pacifist text. To a sympathetic reader, (...) the Laozi therefore constituted an apt reference point for critiquing National Socialism. I then introduce a complication for this wartime reading of the Laozi from the perspective of its ambiguous reception in ancient Chinese political thought. I more specifically discuss an ancient line of interpretation of the Laozi that points in the direction of authoritarianism — in stark tension with the White Rose message of passive resistance and popular revolt. (shrink)